IT Forensics · Courts
Can malware be an alternative explanation for a digital action?
In legal proceedings, it is sometimes claimed that a suspicious action was not triggered by the user but by malware. Such a claim must neither be dismissed out of hand nor accepted without verification.
The mere discovery of a malware file is not sufficient. What is decisive is whether the malware was actually executed, what functions it has, whether it was active during the relevant period, and whether its behaviour is technically capable of explaining the disputed event.
This transforms the abstract possibility that „malware can do something like this“ into a specific question of evidence: „Are there any traces on this system to suggest that this particular piece of malware could have triggered the alleged incident?“
The actual question of evidence
How is a malware hypothesis tested?
The investigation covers, amongst other things, file and process traces, persistence, configuration, runtime events, network communication and the temporal relationship with the act in question.
In addition, the actual function of the malware must be clarified. A piece of malware that merely displays adverts does not automatically imply that files have been stolen or that the device is being controlled remotely.
Where the limits of what can be said lie
The existence of malware and its causal link to a specific action are two separate matters of proof.
Why LanCologne?
In the case of court-ordered investigations, it is not a matter of which analysis programme displays a match first. What matters is whether the question of evidence can be answered on a technical basis and whether that answer stands up to independent scrutiny.
We adopt an open-minded approach, document the origin of key findings and examine alternative technical explanations. The actual analysis is always carried out on a forensic copy or a dataset that has been securely preserved as evidence. Originals are not examined directly unless absolutely necessary. Where live procedures are technically necessary, any changes that may result from them are explicitly documented.
Depending on the research question, key findings are verified either using a second method appropriate to the subject matter or directly on the basis of the underlying raw data. The tools used for this purpose depend on the evidence and the research question. The key factors are the suitability, professional recognition and traceability of the method – not a product name.
Our report distinguishes between factual findings, technical assessments and remaining uncertainties. A negative finding is justified just as carefully as a positive one.
How we handle court-ordered assignments
How we work – from the court order to the response
We first check whether the matter falls within our area of expertise, what facts the court is basing its decision on, and whether the content or scope of the assignment is clear. If there is any doubt, the court will seek clarification. This is in accordance with Sections 404a and 407a of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO).
Any reasons that might give rise to doubts as to impartiality are examined before the substantive investigation begins and, where appropriate, disclosed to the court.
Devices, data storage media, backups and files provided are identified and documented. The status at the time of the investigation is recorded.
Where technically feasible, a forensic copy or image is created. Hash values and other integrity checks are used to ensure unambiguous identification. The original is retained for future verification.
We determine which evidence would support the alleged event, what contradictory findings are conceivable, and which alternative technical explanations need to be examined.
Only those artefacts which have professional evidential value in relation to the issue in question are examined. Automatic matches are not accepted without verification.
Findings relevant to the decision are – where necessary – cross-checked using a second recognised method, a different technical approach or directly against the raw data.
We explicitly examine what conclusions must not be drawn from the data. We identify missing data, possible deletions, technical limitations, incomplete extracts or contradictory evidence.
The final conclusion is drawn from the documented findings. It is not stated in stronger terms than the data permit.
The main text remains accessible even to those without a background in digital forensics. The technical appendix contains the information required by an independent IT forensic expert to carry out a technical review or prepare a counter-report.
Legal framework
Sections 403, 404a, 407a and 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO); in criminal matters, Sections 72 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO).
The expert provides the factual basis for the case. The legal assessment and the final evaluation of the evidence remain the responsibility of the court.
Frequently Asked Questions
LanCologne – IT Forensics for the Courts
Do you require an independent technical investigation into a matter of evidence for court proceedings? LanCologne examines digital evidence objectively, transparently and in a reproducible manner. We document both positive findings and the absence of evidence, as well as technical limitations, in such a way that the conclusions remain comprehensible to the court and verifiable by an independent IT forensic expert.